If There Is No “Da’at,” How Can We Have Leadership

On Daas Torah: English Translation

Prophecy Under the Microscope

CHALLENGE
According to the Gemara and the Rambam, certain prophecies must come true. However, there are many that did not.

How do we determine if a prophet is false?
It is a matter of halacha that a rabbinical court must know how to prove that a prophet is false in order to punish him as described in Deuteronomy 18:18-22. However, because there has not been prophecy since the time of Malachi, this topic is not discussed in detail in the halachic literature.Elsewhere, we have explained the positions of a number of rishonim. Here, we will only discuss the Rambam's view.

In his introduction to his commentary on the Mishna (Kaffih edition, vol. 1 pp. 3-8) as well as in Hilchot Yesodei HaTorah (1:1-2), Rambam discusses this issue. Rambam explains that there are two types of idolatrous prophets - those who say that a god other than G-d communicated to them and those who say that G-d commanded them to worship idolatry. Additionally, there are non-idolatrous prophets who say that G-d told them to add or subtract from the commandments. These three types are definitely false prophets. However, there are also prophets who give us specific instructions or tell us the future and they may or may not be false prophets. We need to be able to determine whether they are true or false prophets. This is particularly important because every person is obligated to follow a prophet's directions (Deuteronomy 18:15).

How do we determine if a prophet is true or not? Rambam (ibid. pp. 4-5) says that if this person is morally worthy of prophecy, we ask him or her to give us a prophecy of a future event. If this prophecy does not come totally true then we know that this prophet is false. If it comes true then we continue this a few times until we are certain that this is a true prophet. Rambam does not specify how many times.

Rambam (p. 6) then goes on to say that a prophecy for a bad thing does not have to come true because G-d may change His mind. However, a prophecy for a good thing must come true "in order to prove the truth of their prophecy to people." This, of course, is based on the Gemara in Berachot 7a.

However, there is an exception to this rule. Rambam notes that Ya'akov our forefather was scared that something bad might happen to him (Genesis 32:8) even though G-d had already promised him in a prophecy that he would be fine (ibid. 28:15). Why was Ya'akov scared? The Gemara in Berachot 4a says that Ya'akov was scared because his sins might cause G-d to change His mind. Yet, Rambam asks, Ya'akov received a prophecy that he would survive and a prophecy for a good thing must come true. Rambam explains that this rule that a good prophecy must come true only applies to public prophecies, those that the prophet is commanded to tell others. These prophecies must come true because otherwise "there would be no way left in which we can prove a prophecy to be true." However, a personal prophecy, one given to the prophet for himself, does not need to be proven. He knows that G-d spoke to him. Therefore, a private prophecy for good does not have to come true.

Second Return to Israel
It can be asked on the Rambam that the very Gemara that discusses Ya'akov brings another example of a good prophecy that did not come true. Based on the verse in Exodus (15:16), the Gemara says that the Jews who entered Israel in Ezra's time were supposed to witness miracles like in Yehoshua's time but their sins prevented it. Does this not contradict the Rambam's principle (that is based on the Gemara)? Moshe said a prophecy for good but it did not come true because of people's sins.

The answer to this, given by R' Yechezkel Landau in his Tzelach on Berachot (4a sv re'uyim), is quite obvious. The Rambam said twice that the reason a good prophecy must always come true is so that we will be able to test prophets and know that they are true. However, Moshe had already been proven to be the ultimate prophet and needed no testing. Does it not say (Exodus 19:9), "And even in you they will believe forever"? Since there is no question that Moshe was a true prophet, the rule that a good prophecy must always come true, even when undeserved, does not apply. A careful reading of the Rambam's words will show that this is his true intention.

Chulda's Prophecy
Another question that can be raised is that in 2 Kings (22:20) Chulda the prophetess told the king Josiah that he would be laid in his tomb in peace. Yet in 2 Chronicles (35:23) it says that King Josiah was shot by archers during battle. Is this not a case of a phrophecy for good that did not come true? It is not, as the very next verse in 2 Chronicles demonstrates. Rather, Josiah was only injured in battle and he was brought back to Jerusalem, died there, was buried in his ancestral tomb, and was mourned by all of Judah. He truly was laid in his tomb in peace, as Chulda prophesied.

Jeremiah's Seventy Years
The next questioin that has been asked is a little puzzling. Jeremiah said (29:10) that after seventy years in the Babylonian exile, G-d would bring the Jews back to Israel. As a comfort to those who would soon be exiled, Jeremiah told them that the exile would be short. The Gemara in Megillah (12a) says that Daniel, while in Babylonia, tried to calculate when the seventy years ended and made a mistake in the calculations. How is this a problem with Jeremiah's prophecy? He told them that the exile would be short and Daniel was slightly mistaken about how short. In fact, the book of Ezra begins by demonstrating that this prophecy came true (see Ezra 1:1-4).

Indeed, this prophecy came true in many different ways. Esther Rabbah (2:11) tells us based on Esther (1:7) that Achashverosh used utensils from the Holy Temple. However, this is difficult because in Ezra (1:7-8) we are told that Cyrus had previously sent the utensils from the Temple to Israel. If the utensils had already been sent to Israel, how could Achashverosh use them in Shushan? The Ramban (Chiddushim on Talmud, Megillah, end of first chapter) answers this beautifully. We know from Daniel (1:2) that when Yehoyakim was exiled, some of the utensils from the Temple were taken to Babylonia. Eighteen years later, when the Temple was destroyed, the remaining utensils were taken (Jeremiah 52:17-23).

Seventy years after Yehoyakim's exile, in fulfillment of Jeremiah's prophecy, Cyrus gave the Jews permission to return to Israel and rebuild the Holy Temple (Ezra 1:1). This did not end up allowing the Jews to rebuild the Temple, as explained in the book of Ezra, because it had only been fifty two years since the destruction of the Temple. However, some people and, as Ramban points out, some but not all utensils were allowed to return to Israel. The remaining utensils stayed in exile until seventy years from their exile had passed. Not only was Jeremiah's prophecy fulfilled, it was even fulfilled with the utensils of the Temple.

Isaiah's Prophecies
It is also asked that Isaiah (13:17) says that the Medes will conquer Babylonia when it was really the Persians who conquered it. This question is puzzling because Darius the Mede conquered Babylonia (Daniel 5:30-6:1). Is that not a fulfillment of Isaiah's prophecy?

Isaiah (13:19-20) says that Babylonia will be destroyed like Sodom and Gomorrah and will remain uninhabited forever. Did that come true? We recommend that anyone who questions this prophecy visit the city of Babylon. It is nothing but a mound that only archaeologists visit. Compare that to Jerusalem and Alexandria which are still inhabited today.

In Isaiah 7:8, Isaiah tells Achaz that in sixty five years Ephraim will cease being a people. However, the kingdom of Israel was actually conquered twenty two ears after the beginning of Achaz's reign. It seems to us that it would not be a false prophecy if the punishment came quicker than originally prophesied. This only means that the sins of the people made G-d even angrier.

However, Rashi quotes Seder Olam that the sixty five years began at the beginning of Isaiah's prophecies. While the arrangement of the books of the Bible do not imply this, the historical truth is that Isaiah and Amos lived at the same time and prophesied basically the same things to the same people. If you start counting from the beginning of Amos' prophecy (two years before Isaiah), which is justified because Isaiah essentially continued Amos' job, then there are sixty five years from the beginning of these types of prophecies to the destruction of the kingdom of Israel. Is this necessary to prove that Isaiah was not a false prophet? We do not think so. (See also Da'at Mikra's important commentary to this verse.)

While discussing Isaiah's prophecies, let us look at one of his prophecies that was so accurate that modern scholars are forced to say that Isaiah did not really write it but that it was written later. However, those of us who believe in prophecy know that this was the word of G-d through Isaiah. About the mighty Persian conqueror Cyrus, who came to power many years after Isaiah's prophecy, Isaiah (45:1-3) says:
Thus said the Lord to Cyrus, His anointed one - whose right hand He has grasped, treading down nations before him, ungirding the loins of kings, opening doors before him and letting no gate stay shut: I will march before you and level the hills that loom up. I will shatter doors of bronze and cut down iron bars. I will give you treasures concealed in the dark and secret hoards - so that you may know that I am the Lord, the G-d of Israel ,who call you by name.

"Touch-screen"

I a Jewish

Sing a Niggun – The Ultimate Advice

A Chassid came to see the Karliner Rebbe because he was depressed. "I don't know what to do," he said, "I'm not a good Jew, I don’t study enough, I don’t know enough, all I do is work, work, work. But I want to study more. Rebbe, I have a question. What do our great and holy rabbis study on Friday night?"

"Well," said the Karliner, "some study Kabbalah."

"Oh," said the Chassid, "that is not for me."

"No," said the Karliner, "that is not for everybody. But I am sure you study Talmud regularly? How does it go?"

"Rebbe, I am ashamed to admit it, I do not study Talmud regularly. You see, I grew up poor. I had to work from an early age to help out my family. I did not get much of an education. I find the Talmud very difficult."

"And if you study together with a friend?" asked the Karliner.

"My friends also work very hard, they don’t know much either. Besides, I have no time to sit in the study hall for hours. What else can I do?"

"Working hard for your family is a mitzva," said the Karliner. "You can study the weekly Torah reading with Rashi's commentary and with Midrashim."

"Oh no," said the man, "I always found Rashi very difficult. As I told you, I hardly got an education. I struggle through the parsha each week, but it doesn't uplift me. I am a failure. Besides, I am really not a scholar. I prefer to work with my hands. My family is big, I work long hours."

"No Jew is a failure," said the Karliner sternly. "Every Jew can learn. And every Jew should learn. I know something for you. You certainly will enjoy telling beautiful stories about our great sages and tzaddikim (righteous people) with your friends and with your family!"

"I am bad at telling stories," objected said the Chassid. "I always forget the important points, I mix them up and I am not a good talker either. Please, I can't do that..."

The Karliner leaned back in his chair. He closed his eyes and he began to hum. He hummed and he swayed back and forth and the Chassid listened in amazement. This was beautiful. What a melody! And he began to sing along. He never had felt so wonderful before, so close to G-d.

After a long time the singing stopped. The Karliner opened his eyes and looked at the Chassid intently.

"Rebbe," the Chassid exclaimed, "I understand. Oh yes, I do! I don't feel depressed any more. Thank you, thank you!"

And he went home and every Shabbat he sang the most beautiful niggunim. But most of all he loved the niggun of the Karliner Rebbe. And he did not feel depressed anymore.

Ka Echsof Rendition

In competition for best K"E rendition, I personally give this my vote. Think you have a competitor? post the link in comments

I'm a Little Teapot?

Compared to...............


only real difference I'm hearing is major/minor

Future of Gedolim?

As the last of the generation of rabbis born in the early 20th century close their eyes, an age of rabbinical hegemony is coming to an end.

My New Favorite Website

RRRR - Rebbe Reichman's Ruach Revival

Innocence Redeemed

A rant from the soul of an aging youth
Experience’s Antithesis

Reason’s Defier

Truth’s Escapee

Fueler of Fire

Mocked by the many

The old man’s dream

A worn heart’s desire

Cousin of Ignorance and brother to Purity

I'm Pristinely Colorful

I'm Freely contained

I'm Openly bashful

Free from stain

What's lost from a maiden

Passed on to her son

Envied and lusted

Lost with days gone

A transient companion

Unbeknownst to its host

Revered, cherished

 --  and even reborn again -- 

 Within the imaginings of most

Despair not friends of old

Whose age seems to define,

the inability to see things clearly

As you once did upon a time

For the innocence of youth

Still rings with great truth

In the hearts and souls of men,

All that one must say
is “I’m ready, make way”

Breathe deeply and know

He loves you

Chazal vs Personal P'shat

A surprising comment I came across made by none other than R. Chaim ibn Atar, also known as “the Ohr Hachaim Hakadosh”.

דע כי רשות לנו נתונה לפרש משמעות הכתובים בנתיבות העיון ויישוב הדעת הגם שקדמונו ראשונים ויישבו באופן אחר כי ע' פנים לתורה ואין אנו מוזהרים שלא לנטות מדברי הראשונים אלא בפירושים שישתנה הדין לפיהן, ולזה תמצא שהאמוראים אין כח בהם לחלוק על התנאים במשפטי ה' אבל ביישוב הכתובים ובמשמעותן מצינו להם בכמה מקומות שיפרשו באופן אחר
אור החיים, בראשית א:א, ד"ה (א) בעזר

Essentially, he is stating that we should have no qualms about interpreting psukim differently than Chazal, as long as we don’t change the Halacha.

While this view is not surprising in and of itself, it is interesting coming from ibn Atar. Also, it is noteworthy how liberal a person can sound when there is no need to be polemical.

Without Da’as, Whence Da’as Torah?

I. The Middle Path

The issue of “Da’as Torah,” the guidance of Torah scholars on a wide variety of religio-political issues, is one of the key boundaries in Orthodox Jewish segmentations. Charedim take it as a broad and fundamental concept, right wing Modern Orthodox accept it as a general rule of thumb and left wing Modern Orthodox reject it entirely. R. Aharon Lichtenstein has voiced his view many times in the past and it falls into what was just described as right wing Modern Orthodox. He recently expanded his treatment in a way that is both compelling and troubling.

According to R. Lichtenstein, Torah giants have unique wisdom and, while certainly fallible, should be taken very seriously. He has written (link):

These considerations aside, however, even if it were wholly licit to sever all links with contemporary gedolim… such a course would be grossly mistaken… A person, and not only the ordinary layman, needs a gavra rabba [great person], to serve in part as a role-model if possible, and in part as a realization of what Whitehead called “the vision of greatness”; to lift one’s sights and aspirations — extending the bounds of what he strives to achieve, and suffusing him with appreciation and admiration for what he senses he cannot achieve; to guide, on the one hand, and inhibit, on the other. This is not a matter of popular hagiolatry or Carlylean hero-worship. It is a spiritual necessity, all the more so within our tradition, for which an adam gadol [great man] is the embodiment of the mesorah [tradition], and ofTorah she-b’al-peh [the Oral Law].

In a talk over this past Chanukah, subsequently written by a disciple and disseminated by R. Lichtenstein’s yeshiva, the great scholar expanded on his views in a strong, perhaps incendiary, way (link – PDF).

II. Common Sense

R. Lichtenstein describes a private conversation he had with his early mentor, R. Yitzchak Hutner. In disparaging an unnamed Torah scholar, R. Hutner quoted the midrash (Vayikra Rabbah 1:15) that a Torah scholar without “da’as” is worse than an impure animal’s carcass. Someone extremely learned in Talmud and codes can still be ignorant if he lacks “da’as,” if he is incapable of properly understanding and interacting with other people. [See also R. Avraham Grodzinski, Toras Avraham, p. 367ff.]

R. Lichtenstein proceeds to define this “da’as” as common sense with a deep understanding of the situation. A Torah scholar must attempt to understand a person, his place and his standing. “Da’as” requires psychological sensitivity and insight into the questioner and knowledge of the reality as it pertains to the question and questioner. It also demands an introspective knowledge of personal limitations.

In the past, R. Lichtenstein laments, we had Torah giants with great sensitivity such as R. Shlomo Zalman Auerbach and R. Ya’akov Kamenetsky. They understood people and their culture. In contrast, today the Torah giants are intentionally, as a matter of policy, distant from the public. They erect barriers to keep out the goings-on of general society. And they institute self-destructive policies.

III. Two Failures

R. Lichtenstein addresses two specific policies that he finds indicative of poor leadership:
Planned Poverty – With no education or job training, and a requirement to have a large family, the Charedi leadership has set people up for disaster. Where is the wisdom and foresight? Where is the profound sensitivity to the personal anguish these policies cause?
Separatism – A component of the mitzvah to love God is to cause others to love Him. Charedi leaders promote their own communities and in the process alienate, and often harshly insult, outsiders. This, in turn, distances many people from traditional Judaism.

R. Lichtenstein’s strong words are, in my opinion, correct but only the beginning. My views on this subject correspond to his. However, surprisingly missing in this talk is R. Lichtenstein’s characteristic nuance. In past essays, R. Lichtenstein examines the views of those with whom he disagrees in a generous spirit, attempting to understand their rationales and responses. He then evaluates their complete views and explains why he disagrees.

I see none of that here. Why do these Charedi leaders advocate self-imposed poverty? What compels their separatist strategy? Is it really a lack of common sense, or maybe an alternate evaluation of the results or different set of priorities? Presumably, due to the nature of the delivery (a talk and not an essay) or as a rhetorical strategy to express the highly charged atmosphere of the moment, R. Lichtenstein omitted that piece of the analysis. Lacking that, he will only convince those who are already on his side (as I am).

R. Lichtenstein raises important ideological points that are worthy of consideration and, in my opinion, acceptance. I hope that future versions of the discussion, perhaps when the latest furor dies down, add his characteristic nuance so our viewpoint is recorded for posterity in its most compelling form.

Beit Shemesh: Moving on with our lives?

I'm not going to pretend to have the wisdom to make any worthwhile comment about the recent events and political stirrings in beit shemesh. I never intended this website to host matters relevant to politics and the like,[particularly because I don't believe politics to be a worthwhile endavor (see R. Yona on Pirkei avos ch4)].  Understanding that few people are up-to-date with all that has been unfolding in the holy land, I think this post will mark a meaningful exception from my typical outlook.

 Essentially, I cannot help but feel outraged when a battle for achdus is being ignored. These turbulent waters can only be calmed with the willingness of an educated public to express its concerns over the present and voice its hopes for the future. Be it discussed at the dinner table, the street corner or an internet forum, these issues must not be tucked away into the annals of history without a clear understanding of how we should change.  While many of us may truly feel powerless over the development of such disturbing events, moments when fundamental Jewish ideals -- such as Zionism, women's right, human dignity and the unity of our people -- are at stake leave little excuse for passivity.

Ignorance is not an option concerning such reprehensible mistakes. And no, the spreading of this information is not lashon hara for the following (obvious) reasons:


1) Learning from our mistakes is vital to the development of morality and achuds of our people
2) It's public knowledge
3) Ignorance when discussing such matters can (and does) result in a chilul hashem
4) We cannot afford to let another chillul hashem like this occur in the future and education is the only means of prevention

I would recommend those wishing to learn about the true nature of what has been unfolding in beit shemesh see the following links:

                    The original news coverage (subtitled)

  

                    Rationalist Judaism: 

Likely the most relevant and unbiased development of recent events. With numerous links to more relevant articles, it is a great place to begin understanding the travesty taking place before us. Please begin with the oldest relevant article here and then move on to the newer posts

Nach: Prophetic or Canonical?

Sacred Writings and the Jewish Canon
Sacred Writings
The Mishna in Shabbat 115a tells us about a special rabbinic prohibition that was enacted in order to help people avoid the biblical prohibition of extinguishing a fire on Shabbat. If there is a fire and there is no danger to human life then one is generally rabbinically forbidden to remove objects from the burning area. In one's zeal to save property one might come to put out the fire and saving mere property does not override the laws of Shabbat. However, there is an exception. In places where carrying is biblically permitted one is allowed to evacuate "sacred writings". The Mishna says:

ll sacred writings may be saved from the fire whether they are read from or not, and even though if they are written in any language [other than Hebrew] they require genizah(withdrawal). Why do we not read from them? Because of diversion in the study hall.

This Mishna raises a number of fascinating issues but we cannot discuss them all here. We will, however, address a few. What does it mean "read from or not"? What is genizah? What is "diversion in the study hall"? The interested reader is advised to study the related Gemara with commentaries for answers to these questions. Some of these answers raise further questions.
            Rashi explains, and this is clear in the Gemara, that the books of Nevi'im (Prophets) are considered books that are read and the books of Ketuvim (Writings, Hagiographa) are those that are not read. Why are books from Ketuvim not read? The Gemara on 116b offers a number of explanations revolving around laypeople needing instruction in halacha and Ketuvim (such as the deeply philosophical Proverbs) distracting people during the lecture or in the study hall. However, another answer is given in the name of R' Nechemiah. He is quoted as saying that Ketuvim is not read at all on Shabbat so that people will know that if Ketuvim may not be read then certainly contracts and legal documents may not be read either.
            It has been suggested that this grouping of Ketuvim with legal documents implies that R' Nechemiah did not consider Ketuvim to be part of the Bible. This claim is very weak since, after all, R' Nechemiah assumes akal vachomer (inference from major to minor) from Ketuvim to legal documents. This alone implies a difference in status between the two.
           Furthermore, R' Nechemiah was a student of R' Akiva and lived in the second century CE. Already in the first century CE Philo refers to Nevi'im and Ketuvim (De Vita Contemplativa 3:25) as does Josephus (Against Apion 1:37-43). Even well before them, at the end of the second century BCE, Ben Sira's grandson in his introduction to the Greek translation of Ben Sira refers to Nevi'im and Ketuvim. Thus, it is clear that the Jewish canon contained both Nevi'im and Ketuvim centuries before R' Nechemiah lived. But what is this canon, how did it develop, and what does it contain? To answer these questions we turn to R' Shnayer Leiman's masterly work The Canonization of Hebrew Scripture: The Talmudic and Midrashic Evidence. Most of the following is based on Professor Leiman's book.
Canon and Inspiration
A simple formulation of a book being either sacred or mundane is demonstrably incorrect. For example, the Mishna in Eduyot 5:3 says that according to the school of Shammai the book of Ecclesiastes (Kohelet), as to opposed to other sacred books, does not render hands impure. This would seem to imply that the school of Shammai did not consider Ecclesiastes to be part of the Bible. Yet, in Bava Batra 4a we find Bava ben Buta, a member of the school of Shammai, expounding on verses from Ecclesiastes. Similarly, the Mishna in Yadayim 3:5 has R' Yossi ruling that Ecclesiastes does not render hands impure and Megilla 7a has R' Meir saying the same. Yet we find both R' Meir and R' Yossi expounding on verses from Ecclesiastes in Kohelet Rabbah (2:13, 2:19, 3:15). The same can be found regarding R' Shimon ben Menasia in Tosefta Yadayim 2:14 and Mishna Chagiga 1:7. In Megilla 7a Shmuel says that the book of Esther does not render the hands impure because it was divinely inspired to be said but not necessarily to be written. Yet, Shmuel was a disciple of the students of R' Yehuda Hanasi (the compiler of the Mishna) and was certainly aware of the Mishna in Megilla that requires the recitation of Esther on the holiday of Purim. Furthermore, throughout the talmudic tractate of Megilla Shmuel can be found expounding on verses from Esther (e.g. 11a, 13a). Clearly, the concept of sacred writings require more than a simple formulation.
In explaining all of these and many more sources, R' Shnayer Leiman differentiated between two concepts — inspiration and being canonical. An inspired book is one that was written under prophetic inspiration (ruach hakodesh). "A canonical book is a book that is accepted by Jews as authoritative for religious practice and/or doctrine, and whose authority is binding upon the Jewish people for all generations" (Canonization, p. 14). A book can be prophetically inspired but not be canonical. For example, Megilla 14a says that there were thousands of prophets but only those prophecies that were needed for future generations were written down and included in the canon. An example of a book that is canonical but uninspired is Megillat Ta'anit. It was a book that was authoritative and binding but was never claimed to be prophetically inspired. Similarly, the Mishna and Talmud eventually became part of the Jewish canon and are therefore treated with great respect. Yet the authors were certainly not prophets.
We can therefore understand that everyone agreed that Esther and Ecclesiastes were sacred books that were authoritative and binding on the Jewish people. That is why their verses could be used in halachic arguments. One cannot contradict an uncontested Mishna and, similarly, one cannot dispute a verse in the canonical book of Esther. However, there was a disagreement whether these books were also inspired. If they were, they would render the hands impure. If not, they would not render the hands impure. But even those who claimed that Esther was not prophetically inspired to be written agreed that the book was not merely an interesting novel. It was a sacred book written by sages that was both legally and doctrinally binding.

Genizah
In Shabbat 30b we find the following passage that indicates a rabbinic disapproval of the books Ecclesiastes and Proverbs:

The sages wished to withdraw (lignoz) the book of Ecclesiastes because its words are self-contradictory; yet why did they not withdraw it? Because it begins and ends with words of Torah... They also wished to withdraw (lignoz) the book of Proverbs because its words are self-contradictory. Yet why did they not withdraw it? They said: Did we not examine the book of Ecclesiastes and find a reconciliation? Here too let us search.

Were the rabbis willing to remove a book from the Bible because they found its contents objectionable? Quite the opposite. Genizah means withdrawing a book from circulation. When certain books were deemed to be misleading to the average uneducated person, some rabbis judged that it would be better to keep these books private rather than let them mislead the masses. For example, Ecclesiastes 7:3 says "Sorrow is better than laughter" and 2:2 says "I said of laughter, 'It is praiseworthy'". If one were to emphasize the second verse, without mentioning that there is another verse that qualifies the statement one could advocate a lifestyle of irresponsibility. Similarly, Ecclestiastes 11:9 says "Rejoice, young man, in your childhood; let your heart cheer you in the days of your youth." An irresponsible preacher or a careless reader can come away from reading this with a very incorrect and dangerous perspective on life. (See also Vayikra Rabbah 28:1, Kohelet Rabbah 1:3, and Moreh Nevuchim 2:28)
Because of these types of contradictions, there were those who argued that certain books should be withdrawn from public circulation. However, this does not mean that these rabbis considered these works to be either uninspired or non-canonical. As R' Leiman wrote, "This in no way casts aspersions on the sanctity or canonicity of the books. Indeed, it verifies their sanctity and canonicity... Only a firmly established biblical book, or a book or item revered on other grounds could qualify forgenizah" (pp. 79-80). That the reason for recommending withdrawing a book from circulation was that the book could lead a simple reader to heresy is demonstrated in Vayikra Rabbah 28:1.

R' Binyamin ben Levi said: The sages requested withdrawing the book of Ecclesiastes because they found in it matters that lead towards heresy.

Further proof that genizah did not mean denial of a book's canonicity can be derived from the case of Ezekiel. Shabbat 13b tells us that the sages wished to withdraw Ezekiel from circulation because it seemed to contradict accepted halacha. However, Chananiah ben Chizkiah (first century CE) demonstrated that there were no contradictions and that anyone who challenged the accepted halacha based on Ezekiel could be answered.
Genizah in that case could not have meant denial of canonicity because by the time Chananiah ben Chizkiah lived Ezekiel had become an entrenched part of the Jewish canon. Already 200 years prior Ben Sira had implied that Ezekiel was part of the Jewish canon. Perhaps more significantly, nowhere do the rabbis debate whether Ezekiel renders the hands impure. Clearly, the rabbis were unanimous that not only is Ezekiel canonical but it is inspired. Otherwise there would have been a debate over whether or not the book renders the hands impure. As Yechezkel Kaufman wrote (Toldot Ha'emunah Hayisraelit, vol. 8 p. 410 n. 1) "They attempted to withdraw Ezekiel because it troubled them; but they never entertained doubts about its inspired origin."
Similarly, the proposed (but never enacted) withdrawal of Ecclesiastes and Proverbs does not imply a rejection of those books from the Jewish canon. Rather, it signifies that the rabbis correctly observed a people divided due to heretical philosophies about life; they wished to temper the disunity and discourage heresy by withdrawing from circulation books that were being distorted by heretics in order to mislead the masses.
Ben Sira
With all the preceding, we can now understand the attitude of the sages towards the book Ben Sira. On the one hand, the book is quoted a number of times in the rabbinic literature — sometimes as it were a rabbinic statement (e.g. "it is taught", Bava Metzia 112a), sometimes as if it were a biblical verse (e.g. "it is written in the book of Ben Sira", Bereshit Rabbah 91:3), and sometimes with no introduction at all (e.g. Avot 4:4). Yet, Tosefta Yadayim 2:13 says that the book of Ben Sira does not render hands impure, the Gemara in Sanhedrin 100b says that one may not read Ben Sira because there are some objectionable statements in it, and Kohelet Rabbah 12:12 says that whoever brings Ben Sira into his house brings in confusion.
The explanation can be found in a manuscript version of Sanhedrin 100b that is recorded in Dikdukei Sofrim. This version tells us that the sages withdrew (ganzu) the book of Ben Sira. As we said above, only a canonical or otherwise significant book can be withdrawn from circulation. Evidently, Ben Sira was considered an authoritative book of Jewish thought, regardless of whether or not it was divinely inspired. However, it contains some confusing verses that might mislead people into heresy. Therefore, the rabbis withdrew it from circulation and warned people that it can lead to confusion.
While we understand why rabbis would, on occasion, cite Ben Sira as a proof for a statement since Ben Sira is a canonical work, how can they quote passages from a work that has been withdrawn? The anwer to this lies in the manuscript version. "Rav Yosef said: Even though the rabbis withdrew the book of Ben Sira, we expound all the good passages in it." The book itself was prohibited for intensive study. However, occasional citation of famous sayings that originate in the book and are not controversial is allowed. This is confirmed in Kohelet Rabbah 12:12 where it says that Ben Sira was "given for discussion and not for intense study".
© Aishdas 2002

Just take a breath, It'll all be ok :)

Sometimes in life you just need to ask yourself if in 5 years any of this will matter.

4th floor ruckus

In honor of finals week and all those camping out on the 4th floor

stollel nanach

Hammurabi inspiration?

CHALLENGE -The biblical laws are based on the Babylonian laws of Hammurabi

The Laws of Hammurabi
Over the past century and a half, much has been learned about the ancient world in which the stories of the Bible took place. Through archaeology, we have discovered writings from other ancient cultures and are able to compare them with the Bible. One particular comparison that is common is that of the ancient laws with the biblical laws. We have many detailed records of ancient law systems and the similarities between them and the Bible have led to much speculation. In particular, the very extensive and detailed laws of Hammurabi, a Babylonian monarch who is probably King Amraphel mentioned in Genesis 14:1, are used as a point of comparison to the Bible. It is claimed, by emphasizing the similarities between Hammurabi's code and the Bible, that the two are almost identical. Since Hammurabi lived before Moshe, Moshe must have based his laws on Hammurabi's. We will try to show that this is an unnecessary conclusion. Only by emphasizing the similarities do the two codes look similar. By carefully analyzing the differences, however, we find that the two codes are based on strikingly different principles.
Basic Differences
Rabbi J. H. Hertz, in his commentary on the Torah (second edition, p. 405) lists some basic differences between Hammurabi's civilization and laws on the one hand and the Torah's on the other. Perhaps most important is that there are no Babylonian loan-words in the Torah. The legal section has no Babylonian terminology at all. This alone is a key indicator that it is not based on Babylonian laws because, as a general rule, a higher culture forces its language on a primitive people that adopts its culture. If the Torah's laws were based on Hammurabi's, one would expect some of is legal terminology to be adopted as well.
Also, it cannot be minimized that the Babylonian and Jewish societies were extremely different. The Babylonians were industrialized and urbanized; they lived in cities and conducted international commerce. The Jews, however, were nomadic, rural, and primitive. Were they to adopt the laws of a culture that was so different, the laws would have no relevance to their daily lives.
The other differences that Rabbi Hertz lists can be analyzed further to uncover their underlying themes. By doing this, we can understand more than just the details of the laws. We can understand the reasons for the laws. This, Professor Moshe Greenberg has shown, demonstrates the stark differences between these legal codes (Yehezkel Kaufman Jubilee Volume, pp. 5-28). The following is based on Professor Greenberg's analysis.
Source of the Laws
The main difference between the two law systems can be found in the introductions and side comments of the codes. Hammurabi repeatedly refers to his code as "my words which I have inscribed on my monument." They are his words. In the Babylonian theology, the king was appointed by the gods to establish justice. The king was the source of the law.
In the Bible, this is not the case. G-d is the source of the laws. They are referred to as "words of G-d" and never of man. Indeed, violation of the law is seen as a religious sin. "He who acts wilfully [against the law] whether he belongs to the native-born or the aliens is reviling G-d" (Numbers 15:30).
This difference between the source of the law is not merely a matter of theology. It has practical ramifications. For example, in Baylonian law, a man whose wife commits adultery retains the right to pardon the wife and the adulterer. The adultery is a wrong done to the husband and he retains the choice of whether to exercise his right or not.
In the Torah, adultery is not an affront to the husband but to G-d. "If a man commits adultery with the wife of another man, both the adulterer and the adulteress must be put to death" (Leviticus 20:1). The husband has no right to pardon the wife and adulterer because the law is G-d-given. We also see this in earlier narratives where adultery is considered a sin against G-d and not against the husband (Genesis 20:6, 39:8).
In a similar vein, Babylonian law gives the king absolute right to pardon in a capital case. He is the source of the law and can determine exceptions. The Torah allows no such exceptions. The law is given by G-d and the king therefore has no special rights to override it.
Murder
The Torah is strict that murder is punishable by death. Even an animal that kills a person is killed in return. Most importantly, a murderer cannot avoid punishment by paying a fine. "You shall not take a ransom for the life of a murderer who is guilty of death, but he shall surely be put to death" (Numbers 35:31).
Babylonian law, however, allows for the murdered's family to accept a ransom in lieu of death. They have the right to decide whether to have the murderer executed or merely fined. The affront is to them, the family of the murdered, and therefore the right to waive punishment is also theirs.
The Torah, however, is explicit why it does not allow this. "Whoever sheds the blood of man, by man shall his blood be shed; for in the image of G-d was man made" (Genesis 9:6). G-d created people in His image and anyone who murders a person is sinning to G-d. Only He can determine the punishment. The murdered's family has no right to waive punishment because the sin was to G-d and not just to them.
Value of Life
In the Torah, human life is considered invaluable because a person was created in the image of G-d. As we said above, no ransom can be made for a life. Similarly, no innocent life may be forfeited to pay the debt of another life.
Babylonian law, however, allows the murdered's family to demand a similar victim from the murderer's family. For example, the father of the victim may demand that the murderer's son be killed. This would cause the murderer to suffer the same loss as the murdered's family. This financial equivalence of human life and the ability to even the losses is in stark contrast to the Torah. The Torah views each life as being of divine origin. Babylonian law views each life as an economic asset.
Similarly, Babylonian law applies the death penalty to certain property crimes. Breaking and entering, looting at a fire, and theft are punishable by death. Evidently, this is due to the valuation of a life in economic terms. A person's life is viewed as a property value and can therefore be forfeited for property crimes. The Torah never assigns the death penalty for property offenses.
Individual Culpability
We find in Babylonian law the concept of vicarious punishment. A penalty is sometimes inflicted on someone other than the actual culprit. For example, a creditor who so mistreats the son of a debtor that the son dies, must lose his own son. A man who kills the pregnant daughter of another must lose his own daughter. If a poorly constructed house falls and kills the owner's son, the builder's son must be executed. Crime is viewed as a family matter and family members may be punished for each other's crimes.
This is not the case in the Torah. Deuteronomy 24:16 makes quite clear that courts may not punish anyone but the culprit - "Parents shall not be put to death for children, nor children for parents; each shall be put to death for his own crime". We see a similar hint to this in Exodus 21:31 regarding the goring of an ox - "Whether it gored a son or a daughter, according to this judgement it shall be done to him". The same law applies whether an ox gores an adult or a child. There is no familial culpability in the Torah.
The underlying conceptual differences between the Torah and Hammurabi's code demonstrate that there was no borrowing between the two systems. The Torah's law has fundamentally different values and cannot have been based on Babylonian law. The Torah views the law as G-d-given and human life as sacred. This is entirely different from Hammurabi's man-made law that views life as an economic asset. The two laws may look similar in some respects but their underlying postulates are so different that one cannot have been based on the other

Closing the gaps with Archeology

      Our ability to trace Oral Tradition back in historical time used to be quite limited. Although later books of Tanach, such as Ezekiel, Chronicles and Ezra provide evidence of an oral tradition in how they interpret Mosaic Law,[1] the trail appears to go cold after the close of the Biblical period. The early Second Temple period is the dark ages of Jewish history and we do not know very much about this period at all. The trail of Oral Law is picked up again toward the end of the Second Temple period by scholars such as R. Dovid Hoffman, Isaac Halevy, Zecharia Frankel,[2] and more recently Chanoch Albeck, Saul Lieberman and many others. These scholars were able to demonstrate incontrovertible antiquity of many mishnaic traditions. They were generally unable to trace them past the middle of the Second Temple period based on internal evidence from the Rabbinic literature alone.

        The discovery of the Dead Sea Scrolls brought forth a wealth of new information, much of which is still being digested. It is already clear, however, that although these scrolls are in majority of sectarian origin, they confirm the existence of many mishnaic laws, some of them in the same arrangement and phrasing that we find in the mishna but 300-400 years before its final editing.[3] What remains then is a span of some 200-300 years after the last Biblical books were written down and the earliest evidence for existence of the Oral Law available form internal Jewish sources. While it is not often possible to trace a specific interpretation or legal statement, general trends are clear.

       The comparative study of Midrash helps close this gap. When we compare a variety of extra-canonical Jewish books and the midrashic sources, we find a great deal of overlap and similarity. Many of these books date back to the beginning or even before the Second Temple period.[4] They come from diverse locations and sectarian standpoints. These works were not written with Ruach Hakodesh and some of them clearly contradict the Rabbinic tradition, marking them as being products of deviant movements. Some of them are Hellenistic, such as Philo, and others, are marked by some degree of contamination by Hellenic thought and philosophy. Septuagint, a translation into Greek that also contains a great deal of interpretation, is the earliest, probably receding the return to Zion. All of them, however, unexpectedly and as a matter of course present remarkably similar interpretative traditions, suggesting that there was a body of traditional interpretative tradition at an early time period that was widely shared among Jews of all types and believes and across widely separated lands. These traditions solve the interpretative problems and fill in narrative gaps in very similar ways. The high degree of uniformity and correlation supports the existence of Oral Tradition at least in the aggadic sphere. To a lesser degree, the same can be said of legal interpretation, although, as we would expect, sectarian tendencies and inaccessibility of legal traditions to some of these authors lead to a wider divergence.[5]

Let us look at one example.[6] Our parsha contain a very ambiguous phrase:

Ben Poras Yosef; ben poras alei ain, banos tsaady alei shur (Genesis 49,22).

           Many possible interpretations of this verse have been offered.[7] Among them is one that sees daughters of Egypt (Banos) prancing on the nearby wall as Yosef's carriage derives by, so he may look at them and also in order they may enjoy his beauty. This interpretation is found in Targum Yonasan, Targum Neofitti[8], Genesis Rabbah and Pirkei D'Rabbi Eliezer.[9] From the latter: "Yosef rode in a chariot and crossed the whole land of Egypt, and the Egyptian girls would climb up on the wall and throw down on him golden rings, so that he might look upon their beauty (39)."

This tradition is also found in 'Joseph and Asnas', a Greek Hellenistic work, probably written in the 1st century C.E and is reflected in Jerome's Vulgate.[10]

         The idea that Joseph was very handsome and that women were attracted to his beauty is reflected in Philo, Testament of Joseph, Testament of Simeon and in Josephus[11] as well as in various midrashim. It is clear that the tradition of Yosef's great beauty and its effect on the daughters of Egyptians was widespread throughout the Jewish world confirming the existence of widespread oral tradition among the Jews. While our example is from the later Second Temple period, there are many similar examples from the early Second Temple period. This kind of evidence strengthens the Orthodox position and enables us to respond to various critical theories, at the same time broadening our understanding of midrash.